

10 February 1971

MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director for Intelligence

**SUBJECT: PFIAB Query on "Washington Report"
Issue of 25 January 1971**

1. Admiral Anderson, Chairman of the PFIAB, was sent the attached issue of the "Washington Report" by Admiral Radford. Admiral Anderson has requested that we put together a review of this issue, which concentrates on recent developments in Cuba, with emphasis on Cienfuegos. Admiral Anderson would like our views on what is accurate and what is not in the article.

2. Would you please let me have your findings for passage to Admiral Anderson, at your convenience.

(Signed) Bronson Tweedy

**Bronson Tweedy
D/DCI/NIPE**

Attachment

cc: ONE

NIPE:BT:dm

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Remarks: You may be interested in this outline of Bob Froehle's comments, scheduled to be given to the PFIAB today, 4 Feb. They were obtained by [] who, as you know, is on loan to Froehle's office from this staff.

You will note that the first part of page 2 tends to confirm what he told me the other day--his uncertainty of what to say on 8 Feb. on the Army CI problem. The last page also reflects the frustration DOD has with HUMINT.

On the whole, not an unfavorable back-drop for what you may wish to say tomorrow.

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FROM: NAME, ADDRESS AND PHONE NO.	DATE
Bronson Tweedy, D/DCI/NIPE	4 Feb.

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4 Feb. 1971

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(PFIA B)

Today I want to talk about six topics:

- The BRDP recommendations and what we have done about them.
- The recent discussions between Mel Laird and the JCS on DIA command relationships.
- My study of DOD domestic counterintelligence activities.
- Intelligence estimates and intelligence production.
- Human source collection overseas.
- Last, our intelligence fiscal program activities in the DOD.

First, Blue Ribbon Panel

Their recommendations drastic.

They wanted one collection command and one production command.

I drafted four alternatives

Blue ribbon position was the most drastic.

Least drastic made management changes to existing organization.

My recommendations widely discussed.

I recommended least drastic course to Mel on 9 December

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This overtaken by public and congressional concern re

military CI against civilians.

Mel took action on 23 December

- Directed me to review directives, organization and procedures.
- Directed DIA to report directly to him
- Put all CI and HUMINT under DIA operational control.
- Told me to hold press conference on these changes -

this is due 8 February.

I have drafted new directive to spell out military CI restrictions in U.S.

We have discussed Mel's action with community and JCS.

Now not sure that putting DIA in charge is the best way to demonstrate tight civilian control of CI.

Also have second thoughts on HUMINT - not closely CI related.

Time is critical on this problem. I go before Senator Erwin 23 February.

Move on to estimates.

You asked about products, analysis, and estimating process.

I sent George memo 31 December on DIA and CIA estimates.

Some duplication. CIA perhaps too much into military.

Need to clarify demarcation.

Drastic action now would hurt more than help. DIA and CIA improving relationships.

Don Bennett's reorganization a big help for his estimates. He will talk about specifics.

About quality of people.

Tough to answer.

Don's new shop concentrates his best talent.

He has problems with grade structure.

DIA behind CIA and NSA in grades - not aggressive on problem before Don got there.

Now difficult to correct. Limited dollars and supergrade slots.

Are we producing too much?

Answer basically no. Real customer demand growing all the time. Some intelligence production can be cut. Basic intelligence and mapping on low priority areas are candidates. With limited dollars, these activities should be examined for cutback.

Some Service and command production activities could be consolidated. In general, cut production resources last.

This is payoff of whole process. Existing production resources out of balance with heavy collection and processing investment.

Should put more R&D - much more - in new methods of analysis. Must get more use out of huge collection data take coming in. Old methods of analysis and production not doing the job. Need new ones, better ones. A major deficiency.

Now HUMINT

A perennial management problem in DOD.

DIA has submitted report through JCS

STAT

Abolish joint center at as ineffective.

Keep DIA role limited to technical direction of Service HUMINT operations.

I have reservations on DIA management through technical control only.

There is duplication.

Activities can be consolidated.

Money for HUMINT should be spent more efficiently.

I think stronger management needed to do these.